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Abstract
In a democracy it is through the process of voting that people find an 
opportunity to register their likes and dislikes of domestic and foreign 
policy decisions most effectively. In Turkey, the recent national elections 
on 22 July 2007 provided an opportunity to observe the nexus between 
voters’ choices and foreign policy issues. Questions pertaining to prob-
lems facing the country and the campaign issues fail to give any clue as to 
whether people paid attention to foreign policy in making their choices 
among the political parties of the country. However, a closer examination 
of the factors determining the vote indicates that, although party iden-
tification and satisfaction with the performance of the economy and the 
expectations of the government in managing the economy played major 
roles, attitudes towards the European Union (EU), nationalism, and glo-
balization closely followed in magnitude those two factors in determin-
ing the voters’ party preferences across the left-right spectrum. While 
AKP supporters had the most favorable attitude towards the EU, MHP 
supporters appeared highly nationalistic, and CHP voters seemed most 
influenced by positive orientations to openness to the world.
Keywords: Turkish foreign relations, voting behavior, European Union, 
globalism, party identification, economic voting
Introduction
Democracy is a political regime in which the people are to run the gov-
ernment, usually through the agency of their representatives. In theo-
ry, and from time to time also in practice, people are to have a say in 
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policy matters as well. Foreign policy need not be any different from 
any other policy domain in a democracy where the government of and 
by the people rules. However, research on representative democracy — 
which either focuses on the role of political parties in government, or 
on the role of national legislatures on policy-making — have indicated 
that policy-making and execution are processes often determined by an 
interplay of many political forces: interest groups, public bureaucracies, 
the judiciary, and even the dictates of the socio-economic realities of 
life.1 People, or empirically speaking the voters, also have some say in 
matters of policy-making, although their influence may not necessarily 
be very effective. The realms of defense, security, and foreign policy seem 
to be even more removed from the influence of the voters. They are often 
considered non-partisan domains, closely connected to collective inter-
ests, and these interests are not necessarily considered to be matters of 
political conflict. Moreover, voters are often highly parochial in orienta-
tion and show little interest or understanding in foreign policy matters. 
Their political interest span does not necessarily go beyond their imme-
diate city, region or nation, although they may hold some ideas and even 
prejudices about their relatively immediate neighbors, even as they fail 
to pay attention to global affairs or international issues, which are often 
remote from their everyday interactions.
 Occasionally, the foreign relations of the state precipitate a sudden 
gush of public interest, especially when a foreign development (such as 
war, famine, nuclear disaster and the like) come to influence or threaten 
the lives of a people. Turkey’s foreign relations with Iraq; or those of the 
United States with Iraq, or Afghanistan; or, for that matter, Turkey’s for-
eign relations with Greece, Armenia, Cyprus, and the European Union 
(EU); as well as domestic developments in Bosnia, Kosovo, Palestine or 
even Gaza gain popular interest in Turkey from time to time. However, 
public attention to such issues is very limited. Even when the public eye 
keeps vigil over such issues as oil or food prices, many neither under-
stand the global oil or food politics, nor can draw up reasonable sugges-
tions to press the government to act on such issues.
 Nevertheless, with the advent of democracy it is possible to witness 
the public register opinions on the international relations of the nation-
state, engage in debate and deliberation, and occasionally even take ac-
tion on certain foreign policy issues. An increase in the transparency 
of foreign policy issues and a concomitant increase in media and press 
reporting, with all the differences of opinion, surfaces with the advent of 
1 Alan Ware, Political Parties and Party Systems (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996), 349-76.
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democracy. Political party programs and election campaigns also provide 
other venues where foreign policy issues emerge as material of party pro-
paganda. It may even be possible to consider the public mood as a source 
of impact on the way in which political party groups or factions vote in 
the National Assembly. If there is any effective result of the demands 
of the people on the international relations of the country, it should be 
visible at the time of national elections. In this paper, I will analyze how 
perceptions concerning foreign-policy-related issues influenced voters’ 
party preferences in the most recent national elections in Turkey, on 
22 July 2007. In the first part of the paper, I will examine these public 
perceptions during the campaign period running up to these elections, 
while the second part will be devoted to the question whether percep-
tions of foreign policy issues have any impact on the vote that political 
parties obtain in the elections. The latter examination requires convert-
ing foreign policy perceptions into independent variables, the relative 
impacts of which can then be measured vis-à-vis a list of potential factors 
that influence the party preferences of the voters at the polls. Therefore, 
I will use a multivariate model of voting behavior in which perceptions 
of foreign policy play a role as an independent variable, among other 
variables, in determining the voter’s decision to vote for one specific po-
litical party over other, competing ones.
Public perceptions of international relations
At the height of the campaign running up to the 22 July 2007 elections, 
were the voters concerned about any foreign policy issue? Did they con-
sider any issue pertinent to the Turkey’s international relations when 
deciding to vote for one party over the others? The answer to these ques-
tions seems to be that voters were somewhat concerned about the de-
velopments in Northern Iraq, because of the terror campaign that the 
Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (PKK) had re-launched after 2005. As 
public reactions increased with the soaring casualty figures, Northern 
Iraq also seemed to gain notoriety in the public eye, but only as the ori-
gin and hide-out of the PKK, not as Iraq per se. Relations with the US, 
again through the Iraqi nexus; relations with the EU; the seemingly pe-
rennial issue of the Cyprus conflict; and Armenian demands towards 
Turkey, which flare up from time to time to influence Turkey-US and 
Turkey-EU relations — these issues have all received wide coverage in 
the Turkish media. However, none of these issues seems to have a strong 
influences on the agenda of the Turkish electorate (see Table 1).
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 An examination of Table 1 reveals that right before the general elec-
tions on 3 November 2002 three out of four voters mentioned the 
economy, referring to consumer price inflation, unemployment, and 
economic instability, as the fount of the most important problems fac-
ing the country. In 2006, one out of two voters considered several eco-
nomic issues as constituting the most important problem of the country, 
while terror and national security emerged as the second most impor-
tant worry of the public. In fact, by 2007 unemployment, and terror and 
national security emerged as the two most important problems of the 
country, and one out of two voters still mentioned the economy as the 
most important issue facing the country (see Table 1). When compar-
ing the open-ended responses from the surveys conducted in 2002 and 
2007, it becomes obvious that unemployment has continued to be the 
most important problem facing the country.
 In the 2006 national survey, we also probed regarding the most im-
portant problem facing the respondent per se. The responses given to 
this question interestingly reveal that consumer price inflation seemed 
Table 1
Problems facing Turkey (2002-2007) (Open-ended questions)
Sources: Pre - Election and Political Participation Surveys of 2002 and 2007, and the Socio-economic 
orientations and political values survey of 2006 all of which are conducted by Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin 
Kalaycıoğlu of Sabancı University. In the 2002 pre-election survey Üstün Ergüder of Sabancı University 
also participated as a principal investigator.
Turkey’s 
Problem
2002
%
Turkey’s 
Problem
2006
%
Personal 
Problem
2006
%
Turkey’s 
Problem
2007
%
Inflation 19.7 9.6 25.7 8.3
Unemployment 29.8 29.6 18.3 35.4
Economic instability 27.2 8.4 8.3 7.2
Corruption, bribery 3.4 2.8 0.6 2.1
Health, social welfare 2.3 3.9 9.2 3.3
Education 4.4 8.7 6.6 6.2
Terror and national security — 14.9 4.3 21.4
Crime — 2.4 1.5 1.7
Political instability 7.4 3.2 0.7 2.4
Kurdish problem — — 1.6 2.0
Housing, environment, etc. — — 2.7 —
Personal or family-related 
problems — — 5.3 —
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to be more influential on the personal economic affairs of the voter than 
unemployment, although the same respondents considered unemploy-
ment a major problem for the country, and not consumer price inflation. 
At the personal level, most persons were not touched by terror and na-
tional security threats, while healthcare and education emerged as much 
more important issues for individual voters than otherwise reported as 
problems facing the country.
 Our findings indicate that, in the eyes of the voters in Turkey, inter-
national relations do not emerge as one of the more important problems 
facing the country, nor do international events involving the country 
have any precedence over bread and butter, or social welfare issues. Tur-
key’s international relations and foreign policy did not emerge as realms 
of importance at the time of the national elections in 2002 and the 2007 
(see Table 2), nor did they seem to matter during the non-election year 
of 2006 (see Table 1). However, even though people do not prioritize 
foreign policy issues and Turkey’s international relations, they may still 
Table 2
What is the most important issue discussed in the election campaign period of the 
general elections of 22 July 2007? (Open-ended question)
Source: Pre-election survey before the 22 July 2007 general elections.
Campaign issue Frequency Percent
Unemployment 273 13.5
Terror 237 11.7
Presidency 137 6.8
Party propaganda and ascent to power 133 6.6
Gasoline price cut 85 4.2
Economy 84 4.2
Empty promises 61 3.0
University entrance exam and education 52 2.6
Formation of the new government 38 1.9
Agriculture and farming 38 1.9
Inflation 33 1.6
Laicism 17 .8
Democracy 11 .5
Türban 9 .4
Other (miscellaneous domestic and local issues) 167 8.3
Don’t know, no response 643 31.9
Total 2,018 100.0
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be under the influence of the country’s relations with the EU, the US, 
Iraq, Iran, Israel, and so on, when they make up their minds to support 
a specific political party at the polls. Hence, I will next turn to the role 
that Turkey’s international relations play in the party preferences of the 
voters at the polls.
International relations and party preference in Turkey
In earlier research, party identification, the position of the voter on the 
left-right spectrum of ideologies, economic satisfaction, religiosity, and 
ethnicity have been identified as the main sources determining the party 
preferences of voters in Turkey.2 In this paper, I will not attempt to spec-
ify a new model of voting behavior for Turkey, but use the model most 
recently specified for a conference paper,3 and introduce several inde-
pendent variables measuring attitudes towards and perceptions of Tur-
key’s international relations into this model in order to re-estimate party 
preferences with a new specification of the same independent variables. 
Originally containing a few independent variables, the model of party 
preferences had been constructed as a causal model. However, with the 
introduction of new variables tapping attitudes and perceptions of inter-
national relations, the number of independent variables increased, and 
the causal model would become quite cumbersome to use. Instead, I 
propose to test the relative impact of the independent variables tapping 
attitudes, perceptions, and sensitivities towards international relations 
on party preferences, vis-à-vis the previously determined domestic socio-
economic and political variables by means of logistic binary regression.
2 For a review of research findings on voting behavior in Turkey see, Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, 
Turkish Democracy Today: Elections, Participation and Stability in an Islamic Society (London: I. B. 
Tauris, 2007), Üstün Ergüder, “Changing Patterns of Electoral Behavior in Turkey,” Boğaziçi Univer-
sity Journal 8-9 (1980-81), Üstün Ergüder and Richard I. Hofferbert, “The 1983 General Elections in 
Turkey: Continuity or Change in Voting Patterns,” in State, Democracy and the Military: Turkey in the 
1980s, ed. Metin Heper and Ahmet Evin (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), Yılmaz Esmer, “Parties 
and the Electorate: A Comparative Analysis of Voter Profiles of Turkish Political Parties,” in Turkey: 
Political, Social and Economic Challenges in the 1990s, ed. Çiğdem Balım (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1995), 
Yılmaz Esmer, “At the Ballot Box: Determinants of Voting Behavior,” in Politics, Parties, and Elections 
in Turkey, ed. Sabri Sayarı and Yılmaz Esmer (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002), Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Elec-
tions and Party Preferences in Turkey: Changes and Continuities in the 1990s,” Comparative Political 
Studies 27, no. 3 (1994), Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “The Shaping of Party Preferences in Turkey: Coping with 
the Post-Cold War Era,” New Perspectives on Turkey, no. 20 (1999), Ergun Özbudun, “The Turkish 
Party System: Institutionalization, Polarization, and Fragmentation,” Middle Eastern Studies 17, no. 2 
(1981), Ergun Özbudun, Contemporary Turkish Politics (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000).
3 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu, “Justice and Development Party at the Helm: Resurgence of Islam or Restitution 
of Right of Center Predominant Party?” (paper presented at the Annual Conference of the Midwest 
Political Science Association Palmer House, Chicago, Illinois, 3-6 April 2008).
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Turkey’s foreign relations4
In this paper, overall attitudes towards the world, as well as openness 
(extrovertness) to interactions with foreigners and foreign capital — 
which reflects the attitudes of the Turkish citizens toward globalism ver-
sus autarchy in socio-economic relations — constitute the first set of in-
dependent variables taken into consideration. Tables 3, 4, and 5 contain 
data demonstrating the extent to which voters approved or disapproved 
of changes in foreign and domestic policy vis-à-vis the EU, foreign direct 
investment in the Turkish market, and foreigners settling in Turkey. On 
the whole, voters suggested that the foreign and domestic policies of the 
country needed to further emphasize the importance of all of these three 
issues (see Table 3).
 When examining the attitudes of voters towards Turkey-EU rela-
tions, one discovers that voters emphasize the importance of Turkish 
foreign policy towards the EU, and most voters also seem to empha-
4 The data for this study were collected in a national field survey of voter attitudes, values, beliefs, ori-
entations, and reported behavior concerning party preferences during the general elections in Turkey 
on 22 July 2007, by Ali Çarkoğlu and Ersin Kalaycıoğlu of Sabancı University, İstanbul, Turkey. The aim 
of the study was to collect data on the voters’ party preferences, as well as on voter traits, attitudes, 
values, beliefs, perceptions and expectations of how the macro-economic indicators of Turkey should 
be managed, socio-economic background, cultural orientation, and political issues of the election 
campaign. The aim of the study was to theorize and hypothesize about voting behavior in Turkey and 
unearth determinants of voting behavior in these very general elections. Our sampling procedure 
took a target sample size of 2,000. First, the Turkish Statistical Institute’s (Türkiye İstatistik Kurumu, 
TÜİK) NUT-1 regions were adopted, and the target sample was distributed according to each region’s 
share of urban and rural population according to registered voter records for the 2002 election. We 
used the TÜİK’s block data and decided to take 200 blocks of equal size. Our target was to reach ten 
voters from each block. We applied probability proportionate to the population size (PPS) principle 
in selecting neighborhoods and villages from each TÜİK-1 region of urban and rural localities. All 
neighborhoods and villages were separated into NUT-1 regions, and PPS selection was applied to 
select neighborhoods and villages. For every one of these blocks, we also picked a randomly selected 
replacement in accordance with PPS for cases in which the ten planned interviews could not be com-
pleted in the primary selected neighborhood or village. From each of these neighborhoods, block 
addresses were obtained from the TÜİK. Ten addresses from each neighborhood were given to the 
fieldworkers. If ten interviews could not be completed after two visits to each address, the remain-
ing interviews were completed from the replacement block via the same procedure. In rural areas, 
the selected villages were visited and addresses obtained from the village headman (muhtar). If ten 
interviews from a village could not be completed, its replacement village was visited and the same 
procedure applied. In selecting the individual to be interviewed from each household, an alphabetical 
list of all residents above the age of 18 was first put together. Then, the first name was selected for 
an interview. If this individual was not available for interview, a second individual of the household 
in the same alphabetical order was selected. Individuals who were replacements of the first selection 
were noted in the dataset for tests of significant difference. In order to take account of cancellations 
after the fieldwork controls, at least two interviews were conducted from the replacement lists from 
each urban block and village. The surveys were conducted in the month before the general elections, 
in the heat of the election campaign period when voter attention to political parties, candidates and 
political issues of the day were at their peak. A total of 2,018 prospective voters were interviewed in 
their households, and the resulting sampling error was +/- 2.3 %.
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size that Turkish foreign policy should be so designed as to protect the 
country’s independence in its relationship with the EU (see Tables 3 and 
4). It seems that most voters were ready to support relations with the 
EU, as long as these do not threaten to undermine Turkey’s national 
independence. Indeed, about 40 percent of the voters seemed to think 
that relations with the EU were beneficial to Turkey; another 22 percent 
were undecided about whether Turkey-EU relations were functional or 
dysfunctional for Turkey; and another 25 percent thought that Turkey-
EU relations were damaging to Turkey’s national interests (see Table 5). 
In case of a referendum, about half of the voters stated that they would 
vote “yes” to full membership (see Table 6), although about 70 percent 
thought that Turkey did not need the EU to solve its problems (see Table 
7). Interestingly enough, about 90 percent of the voters held an opinion 
about issues pertaining to Turkey-EU relations, however meaningful or 
sophisticated these opinions may be.
Table 3
The degree to which Turkish foreign policy needs to change (2007)
Scale
Importance of 
Turkish foreign 
policy towards the 
EU (%)
Importance of 
foreign capital 
flow into Turkey 
(%)
Importance of 
foreigners settling 
in Turkey (%)
Much less important 5.1 3.4 7.0
1 2.5 1.9 4.2
2 3.0 2.6 5.7
3 3.0 3.6 5.6
4 3.8 3.9 4.3
About the same 15.9 17.2 17.4
6 7.0 7.8 7.2
7 10.6 10.2 7.0
8 13.9 13.6 10.1
9 7.1 7.9 6.1
Much more important 23.5 23.3 21.6
Undecided .5 .6 .6
Don’t know / no response 4.1 4.0 3.0
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total (Observations) 2,018 2,018 2,018
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Table 4
Turkish foreign policy towards the EU (2007)
Scale Percent
Turkish foreign policy should follow the objective of developing 
close relations with the EU 8.2
1 5.0
2 3.9
3 4.3
4 4.1
Stay the same 16.4
6 4.4
7 6.5
8 9.5
9 7.4
Even though our relations with the EU deteriorates, Turkish 
foreign policy should emphasize the protection of independence 27.8
Don’t know, no response 2.5
Total (%) 100.0
Total (Observations) 2,018
Table 5
How damaging or beneficial will Turkey’s membership in the EU be? (2007)
Response Percent
Very damaging 8,8
1 3,6
2 4,6
3 5.1
4 3.4
Neither damaging nor beneficial 22.1
6 7.3
7 9.4
8 10.6
9 5.0
Very beneficial 9.9
Don’t know, no response 10.3
Total (%) 100.0
Total (Observation) 2,018
N
E
W
 P
E
R
S
P
E
C
T
IV
E
S
 O
N
 T
U
R
K
E
Y
68 Ersin Kalaycıoğlu
When the cultural and political reforms undertaken to promote Tur-
key’s EU membership are probed, a relatively complicated and even 
bleak picture emerges (see Table 8). Only about one third of the popu-
lation of voting age approved of any reform to improve the status of 
Alevis in Turkey; similarly, another third approved of the abolition of 
the death penalty; and yet another third approved of curbing of the mili-
tary’s opportunities to intervene in civilian politics in Turkey (see Table 
8). Enhanced opportunities for ethnic groups to learn their non-Turk-
ish native dialects and tongues through legal reforms were approved by 
47.6 percent, and increased opportunities to be exposed to mass media 
broadcasting in similar dialects and tongues by about 40.4 percent of 
the voters, with 14.5 and 16.3 percent of the voters neither approving 
nor disapproving these legal reforms (see Table 8). It seems that there is 
a relatively sharp division over the reform agenda for Turkey’s EU mem-
bership in the country.
 Such a picture produces several difficulties for the government and the 
political parties. Whatever position they will take on the issues of cultural 
Table 6
If there were a referendum today would you vote in favor or against
Turkey’s membership in the EU? (2007)
Table 7
Does Turkey need the EU to solve its problems, or does Turkey have 
the capability to solve its problems alone? (2007)
Response Percent
I would vote in favor of Turkey’s membership in the EU 50.9
I would vote against Turkey’s membership in the EU 36.4
Don’t know, no response 12.6
Total (%) 100,0
Total (Observations) 2018
Response Percent
Turkey has the capability to solve its problems alone 71.0
Turkey would need the EU to solve its problems 17.8
Don’t know, no response 11.2
Total (%) 100.0
Total (Observations) 2,018
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and political reform for the EU accession process, they will encounter a 
relatively large minority of voters, interest groups and the media, which 
can often be quite vocal, dead-set against them. Paradoxically, such a pic-
ture both threatens to undermine any initiative on political reform and at 
the same time relieves political parties from popular pressure, for half the 
voters oppose, while the other half support the EU reforms. Thus, a politi-
cal party in opposition enjoys the liberty to resist the EU reforms and, once 
in government, to promote them, or vice versa. Finally, the popular sensi-
tivities towards national independence also provide political parties with 
additional flexibility in opposing and supporting the EU reform process 
at whim. When opposing certain reform legislation, they can always argue 
that they are not against EU reforms, but that the legislation in question 
does not sufficiently protect or promote national independence or inter-
est. When they change their position on similar legislation in the future, 
they can also argue that what they propose now is in agreement with the 
national independence and interests of Turkey.
 Finally, a set of questions probed the national threat perceptions of vot-
ers in the pre-election survey of June/July 2007. A set of questions scruti-
nized whether voters thought that there were any states, communities or 
organizations that threatened Turkey, and several suggestions from which 
to choose were presented to the respondents. The responses given by the 
voters are tabulated in Table 9. Interestingly, 95 or more percent of the vot-
ers responded to each question, and 53 percent argued that the US con-
stituted a severe threat to Turkey, followed by 40.2 percent registering an 
identical opinion for Israel, followed by Iraq (33.8 percent) and Christian 
missionaries (33.5 percent) tied in third place. Close to 30 percent also 
considered the EU a severe threat to Turkey, while 23.1 percent believed 
that Iran was a severe threat, followed by 21.1 percent identifying minori-
ties in Turkey as a source of threat (see Table 9). Intriguing here is not 
that there is such a large majority who feel threatened by the US, although 
the source of such a development is difficult to identify, for the US is not 
only a NATO ally, but the most important strategic foreign asset for the 
governing party AKP and a major help in sorting out the financial mess 
into which Turkey embroiled itself in the early 2000s. It is perhaps the 
entanglement of the AKP government with the US in the process that 
led to the war in Iraq and the negative reporting about the “hood” (çuval) 
incident, with a concomitant increase in Islamism in Turkey in the 2000s, 
which have exposed the Turkish masses to anti-Americanism.
 It is also interesting that the potential of Turkey’s next-door neighbor 
Iran for developing nuclear weapons still was not considered a threat in 
June/July 2007, while Israel was perceived as a major threat. Increasing 
N
E
W
 P
E
R
S
P
E
C
T
IV
E
S
 O
N
 T
U
R
K
E
Y
71
Islamism and conservatism among the Turkish masses seem to prop up 
such an interesting contrast between Iran and Israel in the eyes of the 
voters. Probably the most bizarre finding yet is the popular identifica-
tion of Christian missionaries as the third most severe source of threat, 
tied with Iraq. This must be credited to the propaganda efforts of pow-
erful political forces in Turkey, as well as the Turkish media.
 These three sets of attitudes and perceptions may best be categorized 
into meaningful independent variables with the help of factor analysis. 
In Table 10, the findings of the factor solution for the above-mentioned 
items probing attitudes toward Turkish foreign policy, Turkey-EU rela-
tions, attitudes toward cultural and political reforms, and national threat 
perceptions are presented. On close examination, four dimensions on 
which the above-mentioned attitudes and perceptions are loaded emerge, 
and they are as follows: attitudes towards extrovert Turkish foreign policy, 
attitudes towards EU reforms, attitudes towards and perceptions of the 
EU, and national threat perceptions. The corresponding factor scores per 
dimension, which are linearly independent of each other, were calculated 
and saved as four different independent variables, as represented in the 
column headings in Table 10. These factor scores were eventually used as 
four independent variables representing Turkey’s international relations in 
the binary logistic regression model drawn up to estimate the party prefer-
ences of Turkish voters in the 2007 general elections.
Table 9
Voters’ threat perceptions (2007)
Responses USA (%)
EU 
(%)
Iraq 
(%)
Iran 
(%)
Israel 
(%)
Minorities 
(%)
Christian 
missionaries 
(%)
Not a threat at all 5.2 12.6 11.7 22.1 11.9 22.2 17.2
Not much of a 
threat 12.2 27.8 20.5 29.9 19.5 29.8 20.9
Major threat 26.7 26.2 30.4 20.5 24.1 22.8 23.4
Severe threat 53.1 29.8 33.8 23.2 40.2 21.1 33.5
Don’t know, no 
response 2.7 3.5 3.6 4.2 4.3 4.1 5.0
Total (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Total 
(Observation) 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018 2,018
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Table 10
Attitudes towards Turkey’s international relations (2007)
Items Threat EU reforms
Attitudes 
towards 
the EU
Open-ness 
to the 
world
Importance of Turkish foreign policy 
towards the EU -.005 .038 .308 .660
Importance of foreign capital flow into 
Turkey .016 .009 -.030 .784
Importance of foreigners settling in Turkey .113 -.021 -.120 .752
Foreign policy of Turkey should emphasize 
independence .073 .060 -.600 .111
Vote for Turkey’s EU membership in a 
referendum .158 -.147 -.747 -.074
Turkey capable of solving its problems 
without the help of the EU .010 .177 .554 .043
How beneficial or damaging is the EU to 
Turkey -.108 .180 .729 .065
We need to make all sacrifices necessary to 
be an EU member -.100 .335 .628 .036
In the process of EU membership, reforms 
should be undertaken to improve the status 
of Alevis
-.061 .694 .068 -.024
In the process of EU membership, reform 
laws providing the opportunity to learn 
native languages have been a positive 
development
-.044 .859 .126 .018
In the process of EU membership, 
reform laws providing the media with the 
opportunity to broadcast in native languages 
have been a positive development
-.051 .878 .098 .010
In the process of EU membership, the 
reform laws restricting the role of the 
military in Turkish politics have been a 
positive development
-.140 .605 .179 -.077
In the process of EU membership, 
abolishing the death sentence has been a 
positive development
-.129 .491 .181 .107
Security threat: USA .664 -.017 -.122 -.086
Security threat: EU .644 -.114 -.389 -.007
Security threat: Iraq .708 -.022 -.124 .166
Security threat: Iran .708 -.010 -.031 .236
Security threat: Israel .767 -.078 -.039 .002
Security threat: Various minorities in Turkey .631 -.229 -.007 -.023
Security threat: Christian missionaries .668 -.093 .004 -.040
Notes: Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Nor-
malization
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Estimating party preference in Turkey: Operationalization and findings
As already suggested in the preceding pages, a binary logistic regression 
model consisting of independent variables, which has already been used in 
the voting behavior research presented above, and the newly constructed 
independent variables representing attitudes towards international rela-
tions and Turkey’s foreign policy were used to estimate the party prefer-
ences of potential AKP, CHP and MHP voters in the following section.
 The party preference for the AKP was measured as “1” for those who 
registered that they would vote for the AKP on 22 July 2007 in the 
June/July 2007 pre-election survey; all other responses were registered 
as “0.” The party preference for the CHP was measured as “1” for those 
who registered that they would vote for the CHP; all other responses 
were registered as “0.” The party preference for the MHP was measured 
as “1” for those who registered that they would vote for the MHP; again, 
all other responses were registered as “0.”
 In the voting behavior research that I have incorporated in this study 
from a recent publication,5 there are five major independent variables. 
These are religiosity, ethnicity, economic satisfaction, party identifica-
tion and the left-right ideological self-placement of the voter. They are 
measured as follows:
Religiosity
The voters’ feelings towards religion and religious observance were mea-
sured with the help of a set of questions which the respondents answered 
in the pre-election survey of 2007. The questions posed were listed as 
items submitted to a principal components factor analysis run, and they 
are as follows:
1.  Do you belong to a religion?
2. Over the last year, other than funeral services, how often were you able to 
go to the mosque for worship?
3. Irrespective of how often you actually worship, how religious do you con-
sider yourself?
4. Can people freely practice their worship in accordance with the stipula-
tions of their religion?
5. Are religiously observant people under oppression in Turkey?
6. Would you like to see a sharia-based religious state founded in Turkey?”
5 The independent variables and their operationalization have been inserted directly from Kalaycıoğlu, 
“Justice and Development Party at the Helm: Resurgence of Islam or Restitution of Right of Center 
Predominant Party?” 6-11.
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The items do not indicate that they load on a single dimension, for three 
linearly independent dimensions emerged from the factor analysis run 
(see Table 11). One dimension consists of freedom of conscience, an-
other of faith in religion, while the third emphasizes sharia-based prac-
tice and rule in Turkey, which may best be referred to as political Islam. 
The factor scores that correspond to each dimension were separately 
computed and used in the following test of the religiosity hypothesis of 
party identification in Turkey.
Ethnicity
For the purposes of this paper, ethnicity was measured by reference to 
mother tongue and knowledge of Turkish, Kırmanç or other languages. 
In the following tables, the respondents’ first and second mentioned an-
swers to the question “What language did you speak with your mother 
when you were a child?” were measured (Tables 12 and 13). Those who 
spoke a Kurdish dialect with their mother while growing up and who 
are still fluent in a dialect of Kurdish constitute about 11.9 percent of 
the sample. For this paper, ethnicity was measured in terms of those 
whose tongue is a dialect of Kurdish, versus other persons who are flu-
ent only in Turkish. The former category of respondents who registered 
Kurdish as mother tongue was assigned “1” in the data set, while others 
were assigned “0”; they were entered as binary (dummy) variable in the 
following regression analysis.
Table 11
Religiosity in Turkey
Items Freedom of conscience Faith
Political 
Islam
1. R belongs to a religion .046 .866 -.184
2. R attends mosque services to worship .008 .143 .749
3. How religious the R feels .005 .732 .413
4. R freely practices religion and/or worships -.861 -.039 .038
5. Religiously observant people are oppressed .830 .010 .167
6. R desires sharia-based state in Turkey .105 -.084 .691
Notes: “R” stands for Respondent.
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Satisfaction with the Government’s Management of the Economy
Literature on Turkish politics has indicated that evaluations, perceptions 
and reactions to the economic policies of the government are a promi-
nent factor explaining the party preferences of voters in Turkey.6 In this 
study, the economic expectations and perceptions of voters, which de-
fine their “satisfaction with the government’s economic policies” (which 
will be referred to as “economic satisfaction” in the rest of this paper) was 
operationalized by means of a principal factor analysis of six items that 
tapped the following:
6 For a more detailed treatment of the role of economic variables in explaining voting behavior in Tur-
key see, Ali Çarkoğlu, “Ideology or Economic Pragmatism? Profiling Turkish Voters in 2007,” Turkish 
Studies, vol. 9, no. 2 (2008).
Table 12
Language spoken with the mother at home (first mentioned)
Table 13
Language spoken with the mother at home (second mentioned)
Language Frequency Percent
Turkish 1,700 84.2
Kırmanç 140 6.9
Arabic 21 1.0
Zaza 18 .9
Laz 7 .3
Other 22 1.1
No response 110 5.5
Total 2,018 100.0
Language Frequency Percent
Turkish 48 2.4
Kırmanç 33 1.6
Arabic 2 .1
Zaza 4 .2
Laz 2 .1
Other 4 .2
Missing 1,925 95.4
Total 2,018 100,0
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1. Over the last year, how much of an impact did the economic policies of the 
government have upon your FAMILY’s economic condition?
2. On a similar scale, could you evaluate the impact of the government poli-
cies upon TURKEY’s economic condition?
3. How satisfactory is your PRESENT personal economic condition?
4. How will your FAMILY’s economic condition change over the next year?
5. How will TURKEY’s economic condition change over the next year?
6. In the past year, how has the economic welfare of your household fared?
The first five items were answered with the help of eleven-point scales 
between “very bad = 0” and “very good = 10.” The last item was a five-
point scale that ran between “could only survive with debt = 1” and “able 
to save some income = 5.” After these six items were factor-analyzed 
through a principal components procedure, a single dimension of eco-
nomic satisfaction was extracted, as shown in Table 14. Factor scores for 
the single dimension of economic satisfaction were computed and used 
in the following tests of the economic satisfaction hypothesis.7
Self-placement of voters on the left-right spectrum
The respondents were asked if it made sense to them to place themselves 
on a ten-item scale that ran between extreme left, assigned the numeral 
“1,” and the extreme right, represented by the numeral “10” (see Table 
7 For more details on the theoretical significance of perceptions concerning the economic performance 
of the government in determining the voting behavior of individual voters see, Ibid.: 324-25.
Table 14
Perceptions of and expectations from the government’s economic policies
(Principal component factor solution)
Items Economic Satisfaction
1. Over the last year, how much of an impact did the governments 
economic policies have upon R’s FAMILY’s economic condition? .801
2. On a similar scale, could R evaluate the impact of the government 
policies upon TURKEY’s economic condition? .836
3. How satisfactory is R’s PRESENT personal economic condition? .764
4. How will R’s FAMILY’s economic condition change over the next 
year? .805
5. How will TURKEY’s economic condition change over the next year? .817
6. In the past year, how has R’s household fared economically? .421
Notes: “R” stands for Respondent.
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15). Only 4.1 percent of the respondents were unable to place them-
selves on the scale and were eliminated from the analysis. In their place, 
the mean scores were inserted.
Party identification
The last independent variable incorporated in the following analysis 
is party identification, which has emerged as the most important vari-
able determining voters’ party preferences in Turkey.8 The respondents 
(potential voters) were asked to register whether they identified with a 
8 See, Kalaycıoğlu, “Justice and Development Party at the Helm: Resurgence of Islam or Restitution of 
Right of Center Predominant Party?”
Table 15
The self-placement of voters on the left-right spectrum
Scale items Frequency Percent
1 Most left 116 5.7
2 56 2.8
3 102 5.1
4 68 3.4
5 498 24.7
6 148 7.3
7 194 9.6
8 304 15.1
9 121 6.0
10 Most right 328 16.3
Don’t know, no response 83 4.1
Total 2,018 100.0
Table 16
The party with which the respondent declares identification
Codes Party Frequency Percent
5 AKP 729 36.1
8 BBP 3 .1
2 CHP 250 12.4
4 DP/DYP 57 2.8
3 GP 49 2.4
7 MHP 154 7.6
6 SP 19 .9
1 DTP 27 1.3
0 Independent/Other 685 33.9
Missing No response 45 2.2
Total 2,018 100.0
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political party,9 and if so, to name that political party. In Table 16, those 
respondents who declared identification with political parties in Turkey 
are presented.
Findings: Do Turkey’s international relations matter to the voter?
The most important determinant of the voter’s preference for the AKP 
over other political parties is the party identification of the voter in ques-
tion, closely followed by economic satisfaction. A distant third determi-
nant consists of the attitudes of voters towards the EU, closely followed 
by religiosity (see Table 17). It seems that, among the four independent 
variables that tap international relations and foreign policy, favorable at-
titudes towards the EU are a good indication that the voter in question 
will vote for the AKP. However, a large proportion of the variance in the 
preference for the AKP at the polls is determined by party identification 
and economic considerations (see Table 17).
 The CHP vote is also overwhelmingly determined by party identifi-
cation, remotely followed by economic dissatisfaction, secularism (anti-
religiosity), and positive attitudes towards openness to the world (see 
Table 18). Again, attitudes towards foreign policy and international rela-
tions, this time through extrovert orientations in foreign policy, seem to 
play a relatively humble role in determining the preference for the CHP 
at the polls. Once more, a large proportion of the variance in the prefer-
9 The question we posed was: “Siz herhangi bir siyasal parti taraftarı mısınız / tutar mısınız?” The con-
cept of “party identification” is hard to translate into Turkish, for the concept of identification does not 
exist in colloquial Turkish. For a more thorough analysis of party identification in Turkey, see, Ersin 
Kalaycıoğlu, “Attitudinal Orientation to Party Organizations in Turkey in the 2000s,” 9, no. 2 (2008).
Table 17
The AKP vote in the 2007 general elections
Independent variables B Sig. Exp(B)
Party (AKP) identification 3.446* .000 31.368
Ethnicity -.531 .067 .588
Overall religiosity .159* .009 1.172
Economic satisfaction .805* .000 2.238
Self-placement on the left-right spectrum .007 .341 1.007
International threat perception .017 .856 1.017
EU reforms .039 .686 1.040
Attitudes towards the EU .316* .001 1.372
Openness to the world -.037 .702 .964
Constant -1.921 .000 .146
Notes: (*) Statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance.
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ence for the CHP at the polls is determined by party identification and 
economic considerations (see Table 18).
 The MHP vote is overwhelmingly determined by party identification, 
remotely followed by economic dissatisfaction, and attitudes towards the 
EU, which are overwhelmingly negative among the MHP supporters at 
the polls (see Table 19). Attitudes towards foreign policy and interna-
tional relations, in the guise of attitudes towards the EU, seem to play 
a role in determining voter preference for the MHP at the polls. How-
ever, these attitudes were overwhelmingly negative for the MHP. Again, 
a large proportion of the variance in the preference for the MHP at the 
polls is determined by party identification and economic considerations 
(see Table 19). Religiosity, an independent variable that plays a role in 
determining the voters’ preferences for the AKP and the CHP, fails to 
play any role among MHP voters. Interestingly, attitudes towards the 
EU seem to play a relatively more important role in determining prefer-
ence for the MHP at the polls. Anti-internationalist attitudes seem to be 
more pronounced in the determination of the preference for the MHP 
than is the case for the CHP as well.
Table 18
The CHP vote in the 2007 general elections
Independent variables B Sig. Exp(B)
Party (CHP) identification 4,299* ,000 73.625
Ethnicity -.746 .154 .474
Overall religiosity -.266* .007 .766
Economic satisfaction -.546* .001 .579
Self-placement on the left-right spectrum -.053 .098 .948
International threat perception -.233 .095 .792
EU reforms .207 .139 1.230
Attitudes towards the EU -.022 .879 .979
Openness to the world .409* .004 1.505
Constant -3.176 .000 .042
Notes: (*) Statistically significant at the 0.01 level of significance.
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Conclusion
International relations and foreign policy rarely capture the attention 
of voters in Turkey; most voters are oriented towards the major politi-
cal parties through party identification and economic concerns. Most 
voters also consider bread and butter, as well as social welfare issues the 
most pressing concerns of the day. When terrorism emerges as a political 
weapon of the Kurdish nationalists in Turkey, security concerns also re-
surface. However, it is uncertain whether PKK-incited terror campaigns 
are considered domestic or international, or even both by the voters.
 The most important variable determining voters’ party preferences 
is party identification, a psychological trait determined by the political 
socialization experiences of the Turkish voters. Party identification is 
shaped by family background, political conditioning at home, in school, 
at the workplace, and through social interactions with peers and others 
in his or her reference group. Party identification is relatively constant 
and not likely to change from one election to the next. Our data indi-
cates that about six out of every ten voters identify themselves with a 
political party. The rest of the voters are independents and shift their 
votes on the basis of several socio-economic and political factors. In fact, 
the economy emerges as the most important of these factors for the in-
dependents and perhaps even some of the party identifiers as well.
 Therefore, if there is a single most important issue that determines 
the election outcome, it seems to be the economy. The image or expecta-
tions of the voter regarding how well the government has been handling 
and will go on handling the Turkish economy determines the voter’s 
party preference in the national elections. If the image so determined is 
Table 19
The MHP vote in the 2007 general elections
Independent variables B Sig. Exp(B)
Party (MHP) identification 4.654* ,000 104,997
Ethnicity -.749 .390 .473
Overall religiosity .011 .921 1.011
Economic satisfaction -.597* .000 .551
Self-placement on the left-right spectrum -.002 .896 .998
International threat perception .301 .079 1.351
EU reforms -.177 .257 .838
Attitudes towards the EU -.421* .023 .656
Openness to the world -.016 .911 .984
Constant -3.957 .000 .019
Notes: (*) Statistically significant at the 0.05 level of significance.
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positive, the voter tends to prefer the government over the opposition. If 
otherwise, the voter tends to support the opposition.
 Nevertheless, such a finding does not mean that attitudes and per-
ceptions of foreign policy and international relations do not play a role 
in the context of a democratic environment. On the contrary, especially 
attitudes towards the EU seem to play a role in determining the voters’ 
party preferences, and probably also the overall images of political par-
ties, as well as how voters orient themselves to politics and parties.
 This paper has not dealt with the status and role of international rela-
tions and foreign policy in the media and, through them, in the political 
agenda of the country. However, it goes without saying that a relatively 
small but still important part of the press and media coverage of current 
issues have always been about the international affairs of Turkey. Several 
editorials appear every day, and almost all TV networks run programs 
covering the international developments of the day, as they often occur 
close to Turkey, in the Middle East, the Caucasus, or the Balkans. Such 
developments often have repercussions in Turkey, for as a nation-state 
built upon the legacy of the Ottoman Empire, various nationalities and 
communities who live in those turbulent regions have cultural, econom-
ic and even political linkages with Turkey. No major party can afford to 
ignore the plight of the Turkmen and the Kurds in Iraq, the Turks in 
Bosnia, Macedonia, Bulgaria, Kosovo, and elsewhere, for the risks can 
be quite high at the polls. Such communities have interest groups in 
Turkey, who are ready to pressure the government and the main opposi-
tion party to engage in the affairs of their brethren whenever they find 
themselves under threat in the regions surrounding Turkey. Therefore, 
not a day passes without the Turkish media reporting about the devel-
opments of various communities in and around the country.
 In fact, in the run up to the local elections of 29 March 2009, sud-
denly the plight of the Palestinians emerged as a major campaign issue, 
immaculately exploited by Prime Minister Recep T. Erdoğan and his 
AKP. AKP and Felicity party (SP) politicians connected the fighting 
in Gaza in December and January of 2009 to Sunni Islamic solidar-
ity, on the one hand, and racism, anti-Semitism, and anti-westernism 
among the Turkish right-wing voters, on the other hand. One may even 
get the impression that Gaza is a province of Turkey and that the local 
elections also extend to there. The Gaza issue then seems to play a role 
in changing the political agenda, diverting the voters’ attention from the 
downturn in the economy and the political corruption charges leveled 
against PM Erdoğan and the municipalities under AKP control, while 
simultaneously reinforcing the Islamist/conservative image of the PM 
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and his AKP. What the Gaza issue appears to have accomplished is to 
show us, once again, as with the Bosnia issue earlier, that there are many 
ways in which international affairs can be made to influence domestic 
and even local politics in a democratic regime. It is also interesting that 
the foreign policy actions of the Turkish PM, the President and the For-
eign Ministry seem to have come under the influence of the plight of 
the Palestinians for domestic political reasons, namely through the local 
elections of 29 March 2009. One cannot but wonder whether such an 
issue would have come into the limelight of domestic Turkish politics 
with such force, had Turkey not been going through a local elections 
campaign perceived as a matter of life and death by the governing AKP. 
It appears as if a whole new research agenda has emerged here, tackling a 
myriad of influences of Turkey’s international relations on domestic pol-
itics and foreign policy decision-making. The role of domestic political 
concerns in foreign policy-making, as well as the impact of international 
crisis and relations on Turkey’s domestic political agenda, discourse, and 
behavior, is waiting to be analyzed in further studies.
 In a general sense, Turkey’s international affairs have been part of the 
public debate and constitute a constructive part of the political discourse 
in and outside the Turkish Grand National Assembly, and hence the 
political communication and agenda of the country. The stand of the po-
litical parties on foreign relations and related issues of the day may not 
constitute the most important determinant of their success or failure in 
Turkish politics; however, the voters’ perceptions of the political parties 
are somewhat determined by their stance on foreign relations, and this 
has a bearing on how people vote at the polls. Among these issues, the 
relations with the EU currently occupy a major role, which should come 
as no surprise, for Turkey is involved in highly stressful accession nego-
tiations with this international entity and market.
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